A new type of malware targeting Windows 10 environments operated in customized configurations by some government agencies in Asia has been identified for the first time. Security firm Kaspersky said on the 16th that its Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) had detected a malware framework it named “NetamLoader.” Because the method exploits components of legitimate software to infiltrate and then erases its own traces, critics note that existing security systems that trust update paths will find it difficult to detect.
The investigation began in the first half of this year when a suspicious compressed file was found in the Windows update folder of an affected PC. The file contained a number of legitimate software components, including elements of the third-party patch management tool “Patch My PC” and modules digitally signed by Microsoft. The attackers tampered with some of these auxiliary files, turning them into malware so that the legitimate program would load malicious commands.
Kaspersky confirmed one actually compromised system through its own threat monitoring network. However, it has not yet secured direct evidence to conclude that this attack was the work of a specific hacking group. The initial route by which the malicious file entered the affected system has also not been confirmed, and no evidence has been found that Patch My PC or the distribution system of the relevant software was actually compromised.
The fact that the compressed file in question was stored in the Windows update folder suggests the possibility of a supply chain attack that exploits the software distribution and update process. Supply chain attacks spread malware through the legitimate distribution channels of trusted vendors, making them difficult to block through the defenses of individual companies alone. However, the researchers drew a line, saying no signs of compromise of the distribution system itself had been confirmed.
The most striking feature of NetamLoader is its concealment design. Rather than acting immediately upon execution, it waits idle for 20 to 40 minutes before connecting to an external hacker server to download additional commands and malicious code. This structure makes it difficult to detect malicious activity simply by monitoring network communications for a short period. It also has the capability to delete some Windows system update-related records, erasing traces of its activity. It was analyzed as being elaborately designed to go through multiple stages of concealment so as not to be detected by antivirus programs.
It is also noteworthy that the malware was built to match the customized operating system environment of the government agency in question. Sergey Lozhkin, head of Kaspersky GReAT’s research center for Asia-Pacific and the Middle East and Africa, noted that “technological sovereignty”—reducing dependence on foreign technology—has become a top priority for many governments, and building their own operating systems is often the starting point. “Operating one’s own platform secures control over the system, but at the same time it carries the heavy responsibility of protecting the entire ecosystem without gaps—from the update path to the maintenance tools that the platform depends on,” he said.
He added, “It takes time for such an ecosystem to mature sufficiently,” and “this case shows that we must not only check whether each program is legitimate but also examine how multiple components interact with one another.”
As countermeasures to prevent similar attacks, Kaspersky recommends inspecting abnormal executable files and configuration files within software update folders and verifying the origin of update packages. It also emphasized the need to analyze abnormal code execution by legitimate programs together with connections to external servers, and to store system logs in a separate repository so that they can be traced even if attackers delete records.
This incident sounds a warning for governments around the world seeking to strengthen “technological sovereignty” by adopting their own operating systems. This is because it reveals the challenge that reducing external dependence alone does not guarantee security, and that the maintenance tools and the entire update ecosystem on which their own platforms depend must be managed. In the security industry, there are concerns that attacks exploiting combinations of legitimately signed modules and legitimate programs may increase, making it difficult to respond with integrity checks of individual files alone. There is expected to be growing demand for both companies and institutions to include the update path itself in their threat assumptions and shift to a system that constantly monitors interactions between components.
